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LEWIS v.ALAMANCE COUNTY
99 E3D 600 (4TH CIR. 1996).
I. FACTS
Black voters of Alamance County, North Carolina,
brought suit in federal district court alleging that the
county's system of electing county commissioners vio-
lated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' Alamance
County is governed by a five-member board of county
commissioners, elected at-large to serve four-year stag-
gered terms. In an election, voters may cast as many votes
as there are vacant seats, but a voter may not cast more
than one vote for any candidate. The plaintiff-appellants
charged that this at-large method of electing county com-
missioners diluted the effect of minority votes and
denied black voters an equal opportunity to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice.2
In Thornburg v. Gingles the Supreme Court defined
three necessary preconditions before a challenge to a
multi-member district can be sustained under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.4 A minority group challenging a
multi-member district must be able to show: 1) that the
minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to make up a majority in a single-member dis-
trict; 2) that it is politically cohesive; and 3) that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to
usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate.' The
district court granted Alamance County's motion for
summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence insuf-
ficient to demonstrate the third Gingles precondition
'Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, pro-
vides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a man-
ner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b (f) (2) of this
title, as provided in subsection (b) or this section.
(b) a violation of subsection (a) of this section is estab-
lished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomina-
tion or election in the State or political subdivision are
not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of thisin
that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the politi-
cal process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected
because plaintiffs had not shown that minority-preferred
candidates were usually defeated.6 On appeal, appellants
raised four challenges to the district court's methodolo-
gy. First, appellants claimed that white candidates who
received support from black voters in the general elec-
tion only because they were Democrats should not have
been counted as minority-preferred. Second, the district
court inappropriately aggregated primary and general
election results.Third, the district court should have dis-
counted the success of one black candidate because of
incumbency effects. Finally, appellants contended that
the district court failed to determine whether some indi-




The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the summary judgment for the county.8 Although it criti-
cized some of the methodology employed by the district
court, the majority failed to find reversible error.9 The dis-
trict court had only reviewed elections in which a black
candidate was on the ballot when determining whether
the third Gingles factor existed.The Fourth Circuit held
that plaintiffs must proffer data from a majority of elec-
tions, including those in which only white candidates
run, before they can show that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the
class have been elected to office in the State or politi-
cal subdivision is one circumstance which may be con-
sidered: Provided, That nothing in this section estab-
lishes a right to have members of aprotected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
2Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 E3d 600, 603 (4th Cir.
1996).
3Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
'While Alamance County is not divided into districts, the
Gingles factors are still applicable because the county is a
multi-member political unit, containing five representatives
elected at large. The Fourth Circuit does not address the first
two Gingles factors, but focuses on the third. It will be assumed
that the plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating the
first two Gingles factors.
5Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-1.
6Lewis, 99 E3d at 605.
7Id.
8 d. at 618.
minority's preferred candidate.'" However, the court of
appeals refused to reverse summary judgment because it
is the plaintiffs' burden to establish a § 2 violation, and
therefore their duty to provide data from a sufficient
number of elections."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's treat-
ment of white Democratic candidates who enjoyed a
majority of minority votes in the general election as
minority-preferred, regardless of the amount of minority
support those candidates received in the Democratic pri-
mary.'" The court of appeals held "candidates who
receive 99+% of the black vote in general elections are
the black-preferred candidate in the election, regardless
of their level of support in the primary."'3
The court of appeals agreed with the appellants'
contention "that the district court erred in not distin-
guishing between, and separately analyzing, primaries
and general elections, in determining whether black-pre-
ferred candidates were 'usually' successful"'" The Fourth
Circuit stated that the Voting Rights Act requires equal
opportunity to participate in general elections as well
primary elections.'" However, the court did not disrupt
summary judgment because plaintiffs would not have
prevailed on their Section 2 claim even if primary and
general election results had not been aggregated for eval-
uation. 6
The Fourth Circuit held that in multi-seat elections,
any candidate who receives a majority of the minority
votes, and places behind a successful first choice of
minority voters, should automatically be deemed a
minority-preferred candidate. 7 Furthermore, the district
court erred by failing to treat as minority-preferred some
successful candidates who place second and third
behind the unsuccessful first choice among black vot-
ers.'" The district court's error was harmless because it
favored the plaintiffs.
The district court did not take into account the spe-
cial circumstances surrounding the electoral success of
black candidate O'Kelley. O'Kelley the only black candi-
date ever elected since the passage of the Voting Rights
Act in 1965, was initially appointed to fill a vacant seat,














2 Id. at 632 (Michael, J. dissenting).
tion was unique because even in his first election he had
the benefit of running as an incumbent."0 The Gingles
Court noted that "special circumstances, such as the
absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the utilization
of bullet voting, may explain minority electoral success
in a polarized contest."2' The Fourth Circuit refused to
call the lower court's decision clearly erroneous because
of its failure to discount O'Kelley's success.2
III. ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION
The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs must proffer
data from a substantial majority of elections, including
those in which only white candidates run, before they
can show that the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority's pre-
ferred candidates.23 Relying on Justice Brennan's plurali-
ty opinion in Gingles, the majority decided that the race
of the candidate is not determinative of minority pre-
ferred status.24 Because it is possible for minority voters
to prefer white candidates, the court asserted that the
district court must consider a representative cross sec-
tion of elections before it is able to determine whether
the third Gingles factor exists in a particular case.2"
After establishing that the race of a candidate does
not necessarily correlate with minority-preferred status,
the court addressed the question of how much minority
support the candidate needs to obtain that status. In
Collins v. City of Norfolk, Va., ("Collins II"), the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court erred by identifying as
minority-preferred some successful candidates who
received over 50% of the minority vote, despite the fact
that other unsuccessful candidates had enjoyed a far
greater percentage of the minority vote.26 The Collins II
court recognized the risk of minority vote dilution in
multi-seat at large elections in which voters are allotted
more than one vote:
If black voters exercised their right to cast all of
their allotted votes, they ran the risk that their
second and third choices would be declared their
preferred candidates. Only by single-shot vot-
ing-withholding all votes save for their first
2' Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57.
22 Lewis, 99 E3d at 617. The court also noted that the
plaintiffs' expert failed to analyze the effect of incumbency on
O'Kelley's success. Id.
23 Id. at 611.
24 Id. at 608. "Under § 2, it is the status of the cantidate as
the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the
race of the candidate, that important." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 68
(plurality opinion).
25 Id. at 607-8.
26 Collins v. City of Norfolk, Va., 883 E2d 1232, 1239 (4th
Cir. 1989).
choice, and forfeiting the opportunity to cast all
votes allotted to each voter-could the minority
be assured that its second and third choices
would not be declared its preferred candidates. In
contrast, under the at-large system, the white vot-
ers can freely cast all votes allotted to them with-
out suffering the penalty imposed on the minori-
ty voters. The district court's construction of the
Act defeats the congressional purpose of assuring
that the opportunity to participate in the elec-
toral process is equally open to all citizens."
The Fourth Circuit dismissed this part of Collins H
as dictum and held that Collins II did not "adopt a per se
rule against considering, as minority-preferred, candi-
dates who finished second or third among minority vot-
ers behind an unsuccessful candidate who was the
minority community's first choice."' When the minori-
ty's first choice candidate is unsuccessful, a two-step
inquiry is required for evaluating the minority-preferred
status of successful candidates which finish behind the
first choice.29 First, a court must determine whether the
minority's first choice received significantly greater sup-
port from minority voters than other candidates who
also received 50% of the minority vote.30 If the first
choice did not receive a far greater percentage of the
minority vote, then the other candidates would qualify as
minority-preferred, and the inquiry should cease after
the first step.31 On the other hand, if the unsuccessful
first choice received a far greater percentage of the
minority vote than the second and third place successful
candidates, then the successful candidates would be pre-
sumed not to be minority-preferredY.3 In such a case the
court must proceed to the second step of inquiry and
review each situation individually to decide whether
such a successful candidate could fairly be considered a
representative of minority voters.
3
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that when the
minority's first choice is successful in a multi-seat elec-
tion, any candidate receiving at least 50% of the minority
vote is automatically minority-preferred. 3 All other can-
didates finishing behind the successful first choice must
17Collins II, 883 E2d at 1239-40.







3'Id. See NA.A.CP v. City of Niagra Falls, NY, 65 E3d
1002, 1018 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that a candidate who
received support from less than 50% of minority voters could
receive an individualized determination of whether or
not they may be called minority-preferred.3 5 In effect, the
court's holding allows for candidates who do not even
receive a majority of the minority vote to be deemed the
minority community's chosen representatives.
An overwhelming majority of black voters in
Alamance County are Democrats 6 These voters some-
times support candidates in the Democratic primaries
who fail to receive a Democratic nomination. In the gen-
eral election, many of the same black voters vote for a
Democratic candidate, even though they did not support
that candidate in the primary. Appellants argued that
since the black citizens of Alamance County generally
support Democrats in partisan elections, a Democratic
candidate should only be treated as minority-preferred if
he or she were minority-preferred in the primary."
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's treat-
ment of Democratic candidates, reasoning that the
"Voting Rights Act is clearly concerned with whether
blacks have an equal opportunity to elect the candidate
of their choice in both nominations and elections."
39
Furthermore, to require that the candidate's minority-
preferred status be carried forward from the primary,
would be to ignore the possibility that the candidate's
status might change between the primary and the gen-
eral elections. ° The court also contended that black vot-
ers do not vote monolithically, even in partisan elec-
tion.4 Based on these considerations, the Fourth Circuit
held, "candidates who receive 99+% of the black vote in
general elections are the black-preferred candidate in
that election, regardless of their level of support in the
primary."
4 3
Only one black candidate has ever been elected to
the Alamance County Board of County Commissioners."
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court stated:
[T] he success of a minority candidate in a partic-
ular election does not necessarily prove that the
district did not experience polarized voting in
that election; special circumstances, such as the
absence of an opponent, incumbency, or the uti-
not be minority-preferred).
-Lewis, 99 E3d at 615.






'31d. at 620 (Michael J., dissenting).
"Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57.
lization of bullet voting, may explain minority
electoral success in a polarized contest."5
Appellants argued that the district court should have dis-
counted candidate O'Kelley's electoral success because
of the special circumstances surrounding his victories.
O'Kelley was first appointed to fill a vacant seat and then
won three straight elections.4 6 O'Kelley's first election
was a special election for the seat to which he was
appointed, not an at-large election; and he ran as an
incumbent in the next two elections.17 Gingles establish-
es that special circumstances must be considered when
determining whether the white majority usually blocs
the election of a minority's preferred candidates. The
Fourth Circuit dismissed the Supreme Court's instruc-
tion. "To reverse as clearly erroneous the district court's
decision under these circumstances would be to trans-
form what was at most a narrow or "special" circum-
stance envisioned by the Court only in dicta into a cate-
gorical rule that all electoral success of a minority-pre-
ferred incumbent are to be discounted."
4 7
IVTHE DISSENT
Judge Michael dissented from the majority opinion.
He believed that the plaintiffs had proffered enough evi-
dence of vote dilution to survive summary judgment.48
Judge Michael did not find it necessary to require plain-
tiffs to produce data from all-white elections. 9 However,
he stated that a defendant may proffer such data to rebut
a vote dilution claim. 0 He pointed our that Gingles itself
was based on the review of only those elections that
included a minority candidate, and that no court had
ever before held that plaintiffs are required to produce
evidence of all-white elections.5 1 Judge Michael also dis-
agreed with the majority's holding that plaintiffs must
proffer data from a majority of elections. The Gingles
court had specifically provided that the number of elec-
tions that must be studied would differ from case to
case, depending on the pertinent circumstances.
5 2
The dissent also criticized the majority's methods of
identifying which candidates are and are not minority-










preferred.Judge Michael asserted that complete reliance
on statistical election data is not enough."
At the very least, we must examine the particular
circumstances of each case to discern whether
the electoral support that minority voters give a
candidate (especially in general elections) truly
reflects minority voters' preference or whether
such support is itself a manifestation of a struc-
tural inequality in the challenged voting system. 4
Thus, the dissent urged that a district court must com-
plete both steps of the Collins II analysis whenever it is
determining whether a successful candidate finishing
behind the unsuccessful first choice among minority vot-
ers is minority-preferred.5  The dissent stated that the
first step in the inquiry, (whether the unsuccessful first
choice received a significantly higher percentage of sup-
port than the second and third place finishers), should
only create a presumption for or against minority-pre-
ferred status.' The second step requires the district
court to determine whether the presumption is sup-
ported by the surrounding facts. 57 The majority held that
the court making the determination of minority-pre-
ferred status need only to proceed to the second step if
a candidate in not presumed minority-preferred.8 The
dissent found no need for such a distinction. 9
The dissent also found error in the Fourth Circuit's
holding that whenever the first choice among minority
voters is successful, any candidate who receives a major-
ity of the minority vote is automatically minority-pre-
ferred.60 Judge Michael stated that such a test disregards
the holding in Collins II, that a candidate in a multi-seat
at-large election is not necessarily minority-preferred just
because he or she receives 50% of the minority vote. 6'He
contended that the court's decision undermines the
Voting Rights Act and helps to mask structural inequali-
ties that "work to create the appearance of minority pref-
erence where none actually exists."62 Judge Michael
would hold "that a district court must always make an
individualized determination of whether any second- or
third- place finisher who receives a majority of the











This individualized assessment should take account
of the totality of surrounding circumstances.6 Totality of
circumstances review may entail examining data from
primary elections.6 The district court should also take
into account the "fact that minority voters often support
minority candidates."' Additionally, the dissent would
not recognize any candidate receiving less than a major-
ity of the minority vote as minority-preferred. 67
Finally, the dissent found the inclusion of candidate
O'Kelley's successes problematic. Judge Michael would
hold that "O'Kelley's incumbency, coupled with his
appointment and the unique nature of his 1974 [special]
election, constitute special circumstances requiring that
[the court] discount this election victory"' The dissent
also stated that O'Kelley's second and third victories cre-
ated genuine issues of material fact as to whether they
may be included in determination of the third Gingles
precondition.69
In sum, the dissent would reverse the district court's
summary judgment ruling because the court had not
made individual determinations of who was and was not
a minority-preferred candidate. Furthermore, based on
the election data proffered by the plaintiffs, the dissent
found "that a genuine question of fact exists as to
whether the at-large method for electing commissioners
in Alamance County deprives black voters of the same
opportunity to elect representatives of choice as is
enjoyed by the white voters."7° Judge Michael would
have remanded the case for trial.
7 1
V CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit greatly reduces the potential for
survival of § 2 vote dilution claims. Identifying which
candidates are minority-preferred is a critical step in the
establishment of the third Gingles precondition.While a










1n Gingles, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens concluded,"Under § 2, it is the status of
the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial
group, not the race of the candidate, that is important." Gingles,
478 U.S. at 68 (emphasis in original) (plurality opinion).Justice
White, who joined the rest of the majority opinion, believed the
race of the candidate to be a relevant factor in assessing § 2 vio-
lations. He stated that Justice Brennan's view was "interest
group politics rather than a rule hedging against racial discrim-
ination." Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring). Finally, Justice
whether or not race of the candidate was a relevant fac-
tor in making this determination,72 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a white candidate could be minority-pre-
ferred.7 A problem with the court's assumption is that
minority voters might have to support a white candidate
in an election between white candidates simply because
they have no other choice.
Based on its determination that the race of the can-
didate is irrelevant to minority-preferred status, the
Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff must proffer election
data from a substantial majority of elections, including
those without a black candidate."4 While other circuits
have refused to adopt a per se rule against reviewing
white-on-white elections, most agree that elections that
include both black and white candidates are generally
more probative to vote dilution analysis.75 In contrast, a
vote dilution claim will not survive summary judgment
in the Fourth Circuit unless the plaintiff proffers data
from white-on-white elections.
A better approach than the Fourth Circuit's almost
wholesale inclusion of virtually any white-on-white elec-
tion data when conducting a § 2 analysis, might be to
look at each all-white election individually and include
only those elections which contain a chosen representa-
tive of the minority community. A candidate need not be
black to be a representative, but the totality of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the election should lead to the
conclusion that the minority voters have chosen the can-
didate to represent them. Such a method would preserve
the integrity of the Voting Rights Act, while avoiding the
"political appartheid" feared by the court.
Vote dilution claims are also burdened by the auto-
matic adoption as minority-preferred, of any candidate
who receives a majority of the minority votes, and places
behind a successful first choice candidate among minor-
ity voters. Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the
court's opinion is the possibility that candidates who do
O'Connor, writing for a separate plurality, agreed with Justice
White that the race of a candidate might be relevant in identi-
fying racially polarized voting. Id. at 101 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment).
"3Lewis, 99 E3d at 610.
741d.at 611.
75See, Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 E3d 973,988 n.8 (1st Cir.
1995) ("Although the VRA does not require for a successful sec-
tion 2 showing that minority-preferred candidates be members
of the minority group, elections in which minority candidates
run are often especially probative on the issue of racial bloc
voting."); Nipper v. Smith, 39 E3d 1494, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994)
("It is logical.. .that the most probative evidence of whether
minority voters have an equal opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice is derived from elections involving black candi-
dates.");Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4
E3d 1103, 1125 ("implicit in the Gingles holding is the notion
that black preference is determined from elections which offer
not even receive a majority of the minority vote might be
deemed minority-preferred after an individualized deter-
mination of their status.76
Even if a minority group that has never been able to
elect a minority candidate in a multi-member district can
establish that it is geographically compact and politically
cohesive, it might not be able to prove that the white
majority votes sufficiently to bloc the election of minor-
the choice a black candidate."); Citizens for a Better Gretna v.
City of Gretna, La., 834 E2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e
conclude that Gingles is properly interpreted to hold that the
race of the candidate is in general of less significance than the
race of the voter-but only within the context of an election
that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority
candidate."); Baird v. City of Indianapolis, 976 E2d 357, 361
(7th Cir. 1992) (focused on the race of the candidate and did
not discount victory of a black Republican, even though most
black voters were Democrats). But see, N.A.A.C.P v. City of
Niagra Falls, 65 E3d 1002 (2nd Cir. 1995) (refusing to adopt an
ity-preferred candidates. The Fourth Circuit's expansive
definition of which candidates are minority-preferred
certainly makes their task extremely difficult.The Fourth
Circuit has made it nearly impossible for minority plain-
tiffs to overcome summary judgment and take their § 2
vote dilution claim to trial.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Mona Raza
.approach precluding the possibility that a white candidate can
be the actual and legitimate choice of minority voters" because
such an "approach would project a bleak, if not hopeless, view
of our society-a view inconsistent with our people's aspira-
tions for a multiracial and integrated constitutional democra-
cy."); and Harvell v. Blyrheville School Dist. #5, 71 E3d 1382
(8th Cir.) ("We do not categorically state that a candidate is the
minority-preferred candidate simply because that candidate is a
member of the minority.")
76Lewis, 99 E3d at 614.
